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The 2014/15 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa has highlighted the 
inherent weaknesses associated with the implementation of the International Health 
Regulations (IHR). In this perspective article, the lessons learnt from the outbreak are 
used to review the challenges impeding effective implementation of the IHR and to 
propose policy and strategic options for enhancing its application. While some progress 
has been achieved in implementing the IHR in several countries, numerous challenges 
continue to impede its effectiveness, especially in developing countries, such as those 
affected by the West Africa EVD outbreak. Political and economic sensitivities associated 
with reporting public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC), inadequate 
resources (human and financial), and lack of technical know-how required for implemen-
tation of the IHR are weaknesses that continue to constrain the implementation of the 
regulations. In view of the complex sociopolitical, cultural, and public health dimensions 
of PHEICs, frameworks, such as the IHR, which have legal backing, seem to be the 
most effective and sustainable option for assuring timely detection, notification, and 
response to such events. Renewed efforts to strengthen national and global institu-
tional frameworks for implementation of the IHR are therefore required. Improvements 
in transparency, commitment, and accountability of parties to the IHR, mainstreaming 
of the IHR into national public health governance structures, use of multidisciplinary 
approaches, and mobilization of the required resources for the implementation of the 
IHR are imperative.
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iNtrODUctiON: WeAK iMPLeMeNtAtiON OF tHe 
iNterNAtiONAL HeALtH reGULAtiONs As A cAUse 
OF tHe West AFricA eBOLA OUtBreAK
The International Health Regulations (IHR) is a legal instrument with the purpose of assisting 
countries to prevent and respond to global public health emergencies, which are a threat to the 
world’s population (1). The implementation of the regulations, which are binding in 196 countries 
across the globe, commenced in June 2007. The IHR is a broad legal framework that considers a 
wide range of public health conditions, provides a rational decision making system for member 
states on public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC), and protects the human 
2Olu Revitalizing the International Health Regulations
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org June 2016 | Volume 4 | Article 120
rights of populations. Its effective implementation is expected to 
result in the prevention and control of the international spread of 
diseases, such as the 2014/15 Ebola outbreak in West Africa; this, 
in turn, should translate into a reduction in the restriction on 
international travel and trade – a measure instituted by countries 
in response to disease outbreaks.
The regulations define the rights and responsibilities of signa-
tory countries to build the core capacities required to identify, 
assess, and report events to the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and to respond to public health risks, including disease 
outbreaks. All signatories [known as State Parties (SP)] to the 
regulations were expected to have built these capacities by the end 
of 2012, 5 years after the implementation of the IHR, at national, 
district/intermediate, and community levels. These core capaci-
ties are legislation, coordination, surveillance, response, prepar-
edness, risk communication, human resources, and laboratory 
capacity. The regulations mandate WHO to investigate unofficial 
rumors of public health events and define procedures for the 
WHO Director-General to declare an event as a PHEIC.
The 2014/15 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in West 
Africa is, no doubt, one of the most important PHEICs, severely 
threatening global health security, recently. While intense disease 
transmission was largely confined to West Africa, the impact 
of the outbreak was felt globally. By the time the outbreak was 
declared over in the last principally affected country, Guinea, on 
December 29, 2015, 28,637 cases and 11,315 deaths had been 
reported from 10 countries, making it the biggest outbreak in the 
history of the disease (2).
Fear of importation of the disease resulted in anxiety and 
rushed implementation of unnecessary travel restrictions and 
bans in several countries, causing severe economic loss to both 
the private and public sectors (3). At the community level, the 
outbreak wreaked havoc on social and community norms and 
structures, leading to intense fear and community resistance to 
outbreak control and preventive interventions (3). In the formal 
health-care system, the death of hundreds of health-care workers, 
diversion of human and financial resources from other critical 
public health programs, and weakened health information man-
agement systems totally disrupted health service delivery in the 
three principally affected countries, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone (3, 4).
The magnitude, severity, and geographical spread of this EVD 
outbreak have been attributed to various reasons, including weak 
health systems, urbanization, rising poverty, deep-rooted health 
inequity, deterioration in access to social services, ecological 
changes, and high population mobility, all of which are pervasive 
in the three principally affected countries (5–7). One major 
cause often relegated to the background, loudly resonates-weak 
implementation of the IHR (8).
The outbreak revealed the inherent weaknesses associated 
with the implementation of the IHR. While the first cases of the 
outbreak were reported from Guekedou, Guinea, in December 
2013, a weak disease surveillance and notification system made it 
impossible to officially declare the outbreak until March 2014, by 
which time it had spread to other parts of the country (9). After 
the declaration of the outbreak by WHO as a PHEIC on August 
8, 2015, inadequate capacity for implementation of the IHR 
and the pervasive weak health systems in the affected countries 
constrained timely prevention and control of the outbreak (10). 
Additionally, fear of disease importation resulted in widespread 
disregard of the IHR.
In this perspective article, the lessons learnt from the Ebola 
outbreak are used to review the challenges impeding effective 
implementation of the IHR and to propose policy and strategic 
options for enhancing its implementation.
WHY is tHe iHr NOt eFFective?
While good progress has been made in the implementation of 
the IHR, several challenges continue to impede the full achieve-
ment of its objectives. Key achievements in the implementation 
of the IHR include designation of national focal points (NFPs) 
by several SPs, improved communication and synergy between 
animal and human health sectors through the One Health 
approach, roll out of effective coordination mechanisms for 
emergencies, and utilization of early warning systems as tools 
for early detection and response to emergencies (11).
However, challenges, such as the politically sensitive nature 
of PHEICs and negative impact of these on international trade, 
local tourism, economy, and travel, are barriers for countries to 
promptly report such PHEICs using the IHR. Political sensitivity 
is often fueled by the media attention generated by the announce-
ment of PHEICs, which may, in turn, result in decreased political 
popularity of leaders and reduction in their political power (12). 
This factor may have partially contributed to the late reporting of 
the EVD outbreak and facilitated its rapid spread.
Poor compliance of SPs to the implementation of the required 
core capacities for effective application of the IHR is another 
key challenge (13); by 2012, less than 20% of SPs had fully 
developed the eight national surveillance and response capaci-
ties highlighted in the IHR, which are required for the effective 
prevention and control of disease outbreaks (8). By 2014, this 
had increased to a mere third of the countries concerned (14). 
The low rate of implementation is attributed to a lack of politi-
cal resolve, inadequate resources (human and financial), and 
technical know-how required for development of such capacities, 
especially in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) (11).
Many of the SPs that reported good progress in building these 
core capacities have not been able to translate them into concrete 
actions at national and local levels. For instance, while Sierra 
Leone, one of the principally affected countries, reported more 
than 70% achievement of five out of the eight core capacities in 
its 2014 IHR review report, in reality, the actual capacity on the 
ground during the EVD outbreak was entirely different (15). 
Conspicuous gaps in the national surveillance system, laboratory 
capacity, risk communication, and human resources for health 
hindered an effective response to the outbreak.
World Health Organization has been mandated to monitor 
compliance with the IHR; however, in reality, the authority of 
the organization to carry out this function is often undermined 
by sovereignty of SPs (12). Other challenges to effective imple-
mentation of the IHR, which were glaring during the Ebola 
outbreak include lack of awareness and understanding about 
the IHR provisions, unavailability of the IHR guidelines and 
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weak coordination of its implementation (11), lack of required 
capacity and decision making authority of IHR NFPs, lack of a 
multidisciplinary approach to the implementation of the IHR and 
limited support, and inadequate technical capacity of LMICs to 
build their core capacities among other challenges (11).
Poor community engagement and participation in the imple-
mentation also challenged the effective implementation of the 
IHRs. These barriers often fuel community resistance, which is 
perhaps one of the most important factors responsible for the 
sustained transmission and scale of the EVD outbreak in West 
Africa (5).
Are tHere sUstAiNABLe 
ALterNAtives FOr AssUriNG GLOBAL 
HeALtH secUritY?
Several public health surveillance and response systems and 
networks are available with the aim of complementing the 
IHR. A number of WHO member states are implementing the 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response system (IDSR) 
(16), which aim to promptly detect and respond to disease out-
breaks. Regional networks, such as the Pacific Island Countries 
(PIC), have established public health surveillance initiatives, 
such as the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) 
(17). Evaluation of the IDSR in Uganda demonstrated improved 
preparedness, surveillance, timely detection, and response to out-
breaks, which were associated with implementation of the system 
(18). However, the results of a similar evaluation conducted in 
Tanzania were not so promising (19). This evaluation showed 
weaknesses in capacity for laboratory diagnosis and reporting of 
epidemic-prone diseases.
In response to the weak implementation of the IHR, the 
global health security agenda, a joint initiative between a 
number of United Nations (UN) agencies (including WHO) 
and 48 countries led by the United States of America (USA), 
was established in February 2014 to strengthen the capacity of 
countries to prevent, detect, and respond to pandemics, such as 
the Ebola epidemic (20). This agenda rallied support to respond 
to the EVD outbreak and significantly contributed to its eventual 
prevention and control. Evaluations of the agenda conducted in 
Georgia, Peru, Portugal, Uganda, and the United Kingdom have 
also showed good indications of its ability to strengthen global 
health security (20).
While these initiatives have been instrumental in addressing 
PHEICs, none of them have the comprehensive legal approach of 
the IHR. Given the complex sociopolitical, cultural, and public 
health nature of PHEICs, frameworks with legal backing, such as 
the IHR, seem to be the most sustainable and effective option for 
effectively responding to PHEICs (8). Furthermore, the IHR has 
been tested and found to be valuable in responding to pandem-
ics, such as the 2009 H1N1influenza outbreak (21). The IHR was 
instrumental in the timely declaration of the outbreak as a PHEIC, 
issuance of relevant recommendations for its prevention and 
control, and dissemination of outbreak information among SPs. 
However, challenges (similar to those experienced in the West 
Africa EVD outbreak), such as inadequate capacity for outbreak 
surveillance and response, non-compliance of some SPs with IHR 
rules on travel restriction and trade ban, and inadequate funding 
of the IHR were also observed. The IHR has also been shown to 
be a useful platform for strengthening international cooperation, 
capacity building, and coordination of emergencies (14).
cONcLUsiON: POLicY AND strAteGic 
OPtiONs FOr eNHANciNG 
iMPLeMeNtAtiON OF tHe iHr
The impact and magnitude of the West Africa EVD outbreak 
could have been minimized, if the principally affected countries 
had been able to effectively implement the IHR core capaci-
ties. A strong IHR in these countries would have ensured the 
capacity for timely identification, notification, and effective 
response to the outbreak. With growing urbanization, disease 
vector resistance, climate change, and increased opportunities 
for interactions between disease vectors and humans, there is no 
doubt that the next PHEIC is only a matter of when and where, 
as shown by the ongoing Zika virus, Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus, and Yellow fever outbreaks. Drawing on 
the lessons learnt from the 2014/15 Ebola outbreak, the world 
should be better prepared for PHEICs in the future.
In the absence of better alternatives and in view of the 
good results achieved by the IHR in previous PHEICs, a well 
implemented IHR is the most credible option for improving the 
response to PHEICs. This highlights the need for renewed efforts 
to improve the national and global institutional framework for its 
implementation (8). New and innovative policies, strategies, and 
concerted efforts are, therefore, required from all SPs to promote 
and strengthen implementation of the IHR.
Specifically, strong advocacy to the political leadership of SPs 
should be intensified to galvanize national support for the IHR 
and to strengthen the institutional arrangements required for 
its implementation at the national and sub-national levels. Such 
institutional arrangements should clearly define mechanisms, 
roles, and responsibility for triggering national action in the event 
of a PHEIC. Top level policy dialog is also important to realign 
the provisions of the IHR in the light of the lessons learnt from 
the EVD outbreak and other recent PHEICs, such as the H1N1 
outbreak. The outcome of the ongoing review of the IHR, which 
was commissioned by the World Health Assembly in May 2015, 
should provide further insights into why it was not very effective 
in the prevention and control of the EVD outbreak and propose 
additional recommendations for improving its efficiency during 
future outbreaks.
Furthermore, stronger partnerships between health and other 
national sectors, such as transportation, security, agriculture 
and education, are required to ensure better collaboration and a 
coordinated approach to IHR implementation in countries (22). 
Strengthening of local capacity for implementation of the IHR 
through better community engagement and participation is also 
critical. Community participation in outbreak preparedness and 
response activities would ensure timely detection and reporting 
of outbreaks, especially in remote communities (such as the case 
in this EVD outbreak), better understanding of the local context 
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and culture, effective risk communication, and community 
mobilization for action, which would in turn reduce community 
resistance.
Improvement in transparency, commitment, objectivity, and 
accountability of SPs to the IHR through the establishment of 
mechanisms for facilitating compliance to the provisions of 
the IHR should be encouraged. SPs should be encouraged to 
mainstream the IHR into their national public health policies 
and governance structures; this will empower decision makers 
and IHR NFPs to fast track its implementation. A multidiscipli-
nary approach to the implementation of the IHR should also be 
promoted to foster better coordination and collaboration among 
relevant national sectors.
A combination of negotiation, arbitration, and incentives are 
proposed as methods of encouraging SPs to promptly report 
PHEICs to WHO (12, 21, 23). Incentives should include provi-
sion of adequate resources to respond to emergencies, respect of 
the sovereignty of the affected country, and establishment of a 
global award system to recognize countries that detect, report, 
and respond to emergencies promptly. Other incentives should 
include establishment of mechanisms to ensure minimal negative 
effects of reporting PHEICs and a graded approach to establish a 
midway for declaration of PHEICs (13).
The causes of failure of the IHR and status of its core capacities 
should be independently assessed, particularly in countries that 
are at risk of PHEICs. The findings of such assessments should 
be used to develop plans to fast track the implementation of the 
IHR core capacities in these countries. In addition, strengthening 
the health systems of SPs would complement the IHR capacity to 
detect and respond to PHEICs (13).
Mobilization of the required resources and technical capacity 
for implementation of the IHR should be scaled up, especially in 
LMIC (21); this should be done through the development and 
implementation of effective national, regional, and global emer-
gency public health work forces and emergency funding policies 
and strategies. Intensifying awareness about the importance and 
need for implementation of the IHR is also required in all coun-
tries. Sharing of experiences and best practice in the implementa-
tion of IHR, among LMICs (who are less able to implement the 
core capacities), is also recommended. This could be facilitated 
through south–south and triangular cooperation mechanisms, as 
was done during the EVD outbreak. For instance, through such 
arrangements countries, such as Uganda, with good experience 
in management of EVD outbreaks provided support to manage 
the outbreak in the principally affected countries, while South 
Africa and Nigeria (through funding from the European Union) 
provided laboratory support.
The World Health Assembly should strengthen the mandate 
and capacity of the WHO Secretariat to independently monitor, 
assess, and report PHEICs. In this regard, some level of autonomy 
should be granted to the organization in matters relating to 
PHEICs (24). Adequate staffing, predictable and timely emer-
gency funding, and a strong operational platform should also be 
provided to the organization.
Finally, integration and better coordination of similar initia-
tives, such as the IDSR and PPHSN and the global health security 
agenda, is required to avoid duplication of efforts and to ensure 
a more coordinated and collaborative response to PHEICs in the 
future (16, 17).
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